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Foreword—This paper describes a project that is part of SESAR 
Work Package E, which is addressing long-term and innovative 
research.  
Abstract— This paper presents a modelling approach for 
representing consequences of automation degradation in the 
context of a socio-technical network. This modelling approach 
involves two different notations: FRAM [8] and HAMSTERS [9]. 
In previous work [6] we have proposed a synergistic approach 
integrating these two views for describing the evolution of system 
performances under automation degradation. In the current 
paper we propose a more global approach encompassing the 
previous contribution and being specifically addressing the 
representation of consequences flowing from the occurrence of 
automation degradation. In this approach, four modelling levels 
of consequences are studied: direct consequences of automation 
propagation, consequences on the capacity to respond, 
consequences on resilience capacity and consequences on 
network performance. This stepwise refinement aims at 
acquiring and modelling additional information needed for being 
able to assess the consequences of automation degradation. The 
approach is exemplified on a case study in the domain of Air 
Traffic Management and more precisely Terminal Manoeuvre 
Area including an Arrival Manager (AMAN). Due to space 
constraints only the first level is fully presented.  
Keywords-Automation degradation propagation, capacity to 
respond, resilience, network performance, ATC, AMAN   
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this paper is to describe a first prototype of a 
modelling framework allowing the definition of various 
consequences of automation degradation propagation in a 
complex socio-technical network.  
Objective of the modelling framework is to extend classical 
risk assessment modelling methods with the integration of four 
dimensions: human adaptation capacity, unwanted situations 
respond capacity, resilience capacity and network.  Results of 
the framework aims to be used during automation development 
phases or during deployment phases.   
Paper is structured in three parts. The first part discusses 
automation degradation propagation in complex networks. The 
second part presents the modelling framework. The last part 
describes first result of the application of the first phases of the 
framework to the modelling of the Arrival Manager (AMAN) 
system.  
II. AUTOMATION DEGRADATION PROPAGATION IN 
COMPLEX NETWORKS 
The objective of the study is to define and develop a 
method aiming to support the design of a model of automation 
propagation in a network-based system. The purpose of this 
model is to support the identification of a set of consequences 
due to the occurrence of a failure mode of a specific 
automation on various conditions.  
The modelling context is based on a network-based 
approach. A network is defined as a set of nodes 
interconnected by flows [1].   
Different types of flows are considered. Flow can be 
physical, informational, logical, etc. In the context of ATC the 
main flow is aircrafts. Other flows are information exchange 
between nodes and aircraft responsibility transfer from one 
supervision entity to another.   
Two types of nodes are considered. The first type is 
container nodes which contain the entities that constitute the 
flows of the network. In the context of ATC, airports and 
sectors can be considered as container nodes for flight flows. 
The second type of nodes is defined as supervision nodes. They 
are associated to one or several container nodes, and control the 
 
 
 
flows and react to unwanted situations before they affect the 
performance of the system. In the context of ATC, Tower 
(TWR), Terminal Manoeuvre Area (TMA) and ACC sectors 
can be considered as supervision nodes.  
 Container nodes are characterized by a capacity of flow 
entities they can contain and some actions that can be 
performed: entering, exiting, moving, etc.  
Supervision nodes are characterized by a set of 
responsibilities and a set of resources to perform them. 
Responsibilities are related to a set of obligations to respond to 
a set of situations arising with different frequency and to 
potential sources of perturbations. In the context of ATC, ACC 
nodes for example have to respond to events such as the 
distance between two flights below the minimum; a flight 
being delayed related to its schedule or a flight being short of 
fuel. Resources dedicated responses to the different types of 
situations can be operators such as Executive and Planner, and 
they can be automation such as radar, AMAN, etc.  
The purpose of the modelling method is to represent the 
consequences of the failure of an automated system, how they 
propagate in the ATC system, and the different types of 
consequences on the nodes and the flows in the wider system.  
Model is structured with four modelling levels aiming to 
model different dimensions of Large Scale Socio - Technical 
systems and associated consequences of automation 
degradation (cf. figure 1.).   
Figure 1. Automation degradation consequences analysis modelling level. 
 
The first modelling level is related to automation 
degradation impacts on operator’s performances. Level 1 
consequences are the variability of actions performed by 
operators with the support of automation and the variability of 
operators human factors.   
The second modelling level is related to operator’s capacity 
of respond to unwanted situations under their responsibilities. 
Level 2 consequences are impacts of level 1consequences 
variability on operators respond actions, on the consequences 
of the evolution of the unwanted situation and on operator’s 
human factors.  
The third modelling level is related to node resilience 
capacity, that is to say the capacity of respond to regular, 
irregular and without precedent unwanted situations under their 
responsibilities. Level 3 consequences are impacts of level  2 
consequences variability on operators respond actions, on the 
consequences of the evolution of the unwanted situations  and 
on operators human factors. 
The fourth modelling level is related to network node 
resilience capacity. Level 4 consequences are impacts of level 
3 consequences variability on resilience performance of 
network nodes interconnected with the node studied.  
In order to structure automation degradation propagation 
consequences model, a generic propagation model is defined.  
The generic propagation model aims to structure the 
representation of event susceptible to impacts the performance 
of systems and the propagation of their consequences. The 
model is constituted of a generic pattern structured with five 
concepts:  
 Initial Event. Initial event is the initiator of the 
propagation model. It can be automation degradation, 
human factors variability, clearance reception, etc.   
 Targets. Targets are elements that are affected by the 
variability of initial event. It can be human 
performance, unit performance, flight performance, 
etc.  
 Consequences.  Consequences are impacts of initial 
event on targets. It's generally related to the increase or 
decrease of target properties (stress, fatigue, precision, 
delay etc.).   
 Environment. Environment is related to a set of 
dimensions others than initial event and targets that can 
affect the nature and the intensity of consequences.  
This generic model is applied to the four modelling levels 
in order to produce a generic automation degradation 
propagation model. This model will be the basement of the 
definition of SPAD modelling methodology.  Next sections are 
dedicated to the presentation of this model.  
A. Propagation of automation deradation on operators 
performances  
The first level aims modelling automation degradation 
modes and their consequences on operator’s behaviour.  
 In this level, initial events are related to automation 
degradation modes. It can be partial or total realisation of 
function usually performed by automation [2] (information 
acquisition, information analysis, decision and action selection, 
action implementation, etc.). Targets are related to operator’s 
behaviours, which directly interact with automation in order 
achieving tasks. Behaviours can be defines with a set of 
adaptive modes related to operator’s reaction to the variability 
of his context of action. Environment dimensions are related to 
factors that can affect operator’s performances.  It can be 
human related factors (stress, focus of attention, umber of task 
to be performed, etc.) or be related to context of action (work 
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conditions, presence of available time, crew collaboration 
quality, etc.) Consequences are related to the variability of the 
performance of the functions to be realised by operators with 
the support of automation such as precision of the results, delay 
to obtain the results and to operator’s human factors (stress, 
workload, etc.). Following table present a summary of the 
model (cf. TABLE I. ).  
TABLE I.  ADAPTATION OF PROPAGATION MODEL TO LEVEL 1 
MODELLING LEVEL 
Automation modelling level propagation model 
Initial event Automation degradation mode 
Targets Operators behaviour 
Environment Endogenous and exogenous factors that influence 
operators behaviours 
Consequences Precision and duration of the execution of both 
automation and operators functions 
Operators human factors 
B. Propagation of level 1 consequences on capacity to 
respond 
The second level aims modelling automation degradation 
level 1 consequences impact on associated respond capacity 
performance.  
The capacity to respond can be decomposed into five 
processes [3]:  
 Detect that something has happened, 
 Identify the event,  
 Recognize that the situation requires a response, 
 Define the response, 
 Mobilize resources in order to respond.   
The ability to respond can be influenced by several factors. 
Four factors can be considered related to the balance between 
elements required by the nature and the state of the event to be 
controlled and elements available: 
 Time available versus time required.  
 Resources available versus resources required. 
 Competences available versus competences required.  
 Information available versus information required. 
The balance between elements required and elements 
available has an influence on different dimensions such as 
duration or precision of the response or the operator’s 
capacities. The consequences of variability of those dimensions 
influence the life cycle of events to be controlled and 
associated consequences. If the correct response is not 
performed events may trigger unwanted consequences, and 
require other elements to be controlled.  
In this level, initial events are related to Level 1 
consequences. Targets are related to respond capacity 
performance variability factors. It can be time, resources, 
competences or information. Environment dimensions are 
related to factors that can affect operator’s performances and 
situations to be responded consequences. Consequences are 
related to the variability of the performance of respond 
functions, to the variability of consequences of the situation to 
be controlled and the variability of operator’s human factors. 
Following table present a summary of the model (cf. TABLE 
II. ).  
TABLE II.  ADAPTATION OF PROPAGATION MODEL TO LEVEL 2 
MODELLING LEVEL 
Respond level propagation model 
Initial event Precision and duration of the execution of both 
automation and operators functions 
Operators human factors 
Targets Respond capacity performance variability factors  
Environment Endogenous and exogenous factors influencing 
operators and situation to be respond variability. 
Area of responsibility of operators 
Consequences Respond action consequences 
Situation to be respond consequences 
Operators human factors 
C. Propagation of level 2 consequences on node resilience 
performance  
The third level aims modelling automation degradation 
level 2 consequences impact on node resilience performance.  
Node resilience performance can be define as the intrinsic 
ability “to adjust its functioning prior to, during, or following 
changes and disturbances, so that it can sustain required 
operations under both expected and unexpected conditions”[3].  
Four major capabilities determine node resilience 
performance: ability to respond to both expected and 
unexpected events; ability to learn for unexpected situations to 
understand what can go wrong and for expected situation to 
understand what makes the system go right; ability to monitor 
the performance of the system in considering both lagging and 
leading indicators; ability to anticipate threats and opportunities 
that can be consequence of changes occurring in the system 
and it’s environment [3].  
In order to characterize node resilience, the focus is on the 
capacity to respond. The node resilience model is structured in 
three complementary respond capacities related to the different 
types of situation that can occur [4]: 
 Capacity to respond to normal events. Normal events 
are situations related to the normal functioning of the 
system. Respond functions are based on the application 
of procedures, on behaviours learned during training 
sessions and on resources that are regularly checked.   
 Capacity to respond to regular unexpected events. 
Regular unexpected events are unwanted situations that 
have been anticipated by risk management systems, 
and for which prevention and protection barriers have 
been deployed. Respond functions are based on the 
application of procedures, on behaviours learned 
during training sessions and on resources that are 
regularly checked. 
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 Capacity to respond to irregular unexpected events. 
Irregular unexpected events are unwanted situations 
that are known by the system, but where no adequate 
barriers exist to prevent and protect the system against 
them. Respond functions are based on the ability of 
operators to adjust their behaviour according to the 
requirements of the situation, their knowledge and 
available resources.  
Level 3 is related to the study of impact of respond function 
that use studied automation variability on respond capacities to 
other situation that have to be controlled by the node. Initial 
events are related to Level 2 consequences. Targets are related 
to the other nodes respond capacities performance variability 
factors. Environment dimensions are related to factors that can 
affect operator’s performances and situations to be responded 
consequences. Consequences are related to the variability of 
the performance of all the respond functions, to the variability 
of consequences of all situations to be controlled and the 
variability of operator’s human factors. Following table present 
a summary of the model (cf. TABLE III. ). 
TABLE III.  ADAPTATION OF PROPAGATION MODEL TO LEVEL 3 
MODELLING LEVEL 
Resilience level propagation model 
Initial event Operator variability 
Respond capacity variability 
Targets Regular and irregular situations respond capacity 
performance 
Environment Endogenous and exogenous factors influencing 
operators and regular and irregular situations 
respond situations to be respond variability. 
Area of responsibility of operators 
Consequences Situations to be respond consequences 
Operators human factors 
Environment state 
D.  Propagation of level 3 consequences on nodes resilience 
performance  
The fourth level aims modelling automation degradation 
level 3 consequences impact on resilience performance of 
nodes interconnected with the node studied.   
The propagation of consequences depends on the nature of 
the interactions between the different nodes. Related to the 
modelling context, three types of relations can be considered:  
 Supervision node – Container node 
interdependencies. This relation is related to the 
impact of supervision node variability on the 
associated container node. 
 Supervision node – Supervision node 
interdependencies. This relation is related to the 
impact of supervision node variability on the 
supervision node directly or indirectly connected to it.   
 Container node – Container node 
interdependencies. This relation is related to the 
impact of container node variability on the container 
nodes directly or indirectly connected to it.     
Node interdependencies can be defined, among others, 
along several dimensions [5]:  
 Infrastructure characteristics: spatial, temporal, 
operational and/or organizational.  
 Type of interdependencies: physical, cyber, logical, 
geographic.  
 Coupling and response behaviour: loose/tight, 
linear/complex, adaptive, and inflexible.  
Initial events are related to Level 3 consequences. Targets 
are related to the resilience performance of all the nodes 
interconnected with the studied node. Environment dimensions 
are related to factors that can affect nodes resilience 
performance. Consequences are related to the variability of the 
resilience performance of concerned node, to the variability of 
consequences of all situations to be controlled and the 
variability of container nodes (cf. TABLE IV. TABLE III. ). 
TABLE IV.  ADAPTATION OF PROPAGATION MODEL TO LEVEL 4 
MODELLING LEVEL 
LSSTS level propagation model 
Initial event Node resilience performance variability 
Targets Interconnected nodes resilience performance 
Environment Environment variability 
Nodes responsibilities area zone 
Consequences Node resilience performance  
Situations to be respond consequences 
Container node variability 
Those four levels will be the basis of the definition of a 
modelling framework.  
III. MODELING FRAMEWORK 
Model presented in the previous section aims to be the 
basement of the definition of a modelling method allowing 
automation degradation consequences analysis. This objective 
requires an interdisciplinary approach. The approach followed 
is based on the idea of federation of models. Different models 
related to specific dimensions of each level of analysis are 
interconnected by the means of a generic method. 
This section aims to describe the modelling framework 
developed (see Figure 2).  This development is based on the 
Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) framework 
[6][7][8]. FRAM is a functional-based modelling approach that 
aims to represent the dynamics of systems taking into account 
different dimensions of endogenous, exogenous and functional 
interdependences that may influence the performance of 
functions.  
The method is structured with three generic phases:  
 Context definition. The first phase consists in defining 
the different elements that structure the context of the 
model: initial events, impacts, environment and 
consequences.  
 Functions definition. The second phase consists in 
describing functions that constitute the model. For each 
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function, global variables (environment and system 
properties), aspects (Input, Output, Control, Resources, 
Time and preconditions) and performance modes are 
described. 
 Propagation model definition. The third phase is 
related to the definition of the coupling relations 
between functions allowing the definition of the 
propagation mechanisms.  
 
Figure 2. A process for modelling automation degradation propagation 
consequences  
 
Following sections are related to the description of the 
adaptation of those three steps to the four modelling levels 
considered. Method phases are illustrated with information 
related to the study of AMAN. Arrival Manager (AMAN) is a 
ground based planning tool suggesting to the air traffic 
controller an arrival sequence of aircraft and providing support 
in establishing the optimal aircraft approach routes. 
A. Modeling the direct consequences of automation 
degradation 
The first level aims to support the modelling of the direct 
consequences of automation degradation on operator’s 
performances.  
1) Context definition 
The first phase of the method aims defining the modelling 
context. Level 1 context is related to information about 
automation, operators and the environment.  
Automation is described with its name, functions 
performed, level of automation and functioning modes 
including degradation modes. Operator is described with a title, 
functions performed with the support of studied automation, 
endogenous variability factors and adaptive modes. 
Environment is described with a set of dimensions 
characterized with a label and a scale of variability.  
The following table illustrated this context in the case of 
study of AMAN. 
TABLE V.   LEVEL 1 CONTEXT DEFINITION OF AMAN CASE STUDY 
Level 1 context definition 
Automation AMAN automation is decision and action selection type 
automation. It acquires information about traffic, infers the 
ideal arrival sequence and generates advisories if the gap 
between flight ideal and actual position is superior to 
accepted margin.  
AMAN functioning modes considerated are : 
- AMAN normal functioning. AMAN compute and display 
right information in a reasonable delay.  
- AMAN malfunction. AMAN stops working. 
- AMAN provides misleading information. AMAN display 
wrong information.   
AMAN is semi-autonomous, two operators interact with it, 
Sequence Managers who supervise sequence list and 
eventually correct it and Executive who send clearances to 
flight according to information provided by AMAN. 
Operators Executive operators aims managing the flow of traffic in 
their sectors with respect of sequence list.  
Sequence Manager aims managing sequence list.    
Endogeneous dimensions of varibaility considered are 
training, workload, stress, focus of attention, number of 
tasks ans habit to AMAN.  
Adaptive modes considered are: optimum; average and 
degraded.  
Environment Working conditions   
Complexity of traffic  
Amount of traffic 
 
Context will be use to define FRAM functions and coupling 
relationships.  
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2) Function definition 
The second phase of the modelling method is related to the 
definition of FRAM based functions that constitute the model. 
The structure of the model depends on the level of automation 
of the system studied.  
If the level of automation is autonomous, the model will be 
constituted of only one set of functions related to the 
automation functions. If the level is semi-autonomous, the 
model will be constituted of both automation and operator 
functions.  
Definition of the function is realised by defining FRAM 
aspects (input, output, precondition, resources, time and 
control) for each function performed by automation and 
operators. 
In the context of AMAN study, two functions are 
considerate: "Compute and display Sequence List" and 
"Compute and Display advisories". Two human functions are 
considerate. First is a function of the sequence manager: 
"Control adequacy between sequence list and current situation 
". Second is a function of the executive: "Control adequacy 
between flight’s planned trajectory and flight actual trajectory".  
The following table presents information related to a 
function that has to be defined. Elements are illustrated with 
one of AMAN case study function.  
TABLE VI.  FRAM DESCRIPTION OF " CONTROL ADEQUACY BETWEEN 
FLIGHT PLANNED TRAJECTORY AND FLIGHT ACTUAL TRAJECTORY " 
Control adequacy between flight planned trajectory and 
flight actual trajectory 
Description 
Executive monitor AMAN in order 
to identify if needed manoeuvre to 
be cleared to pilot 
Aspects  
Input(s) AMAN Advisories displayed 
Output(s) Difference identified Maneuver to be cleared defined  
Precondition Traffic in an advanced state 
Resource(s) AMAN, CWP, EXC_TMA 
Control(s) Procedures 
Time   
 
Same work as to be achieved to both automation and 
operators relevant functions.  
3) Propagation model definiton 
The third phase consist in defining propagation model by 
linking each function and characterizing their variability 
model. A relation between automation degradation modes, 
operators’ variability (if the level of automation is semi-
autonomous), environment variability and variability of the 
outputs of the functions is defined.   
Automation functions variability model is related to the 
relation between degradation modes and automation functions 
outputs. Automation functions state model is related to the 
different degradation modes identified. For each degradation 
modes, a value is associated to the different output of the 
functions. Following table describes this relation for one of 
AMAN functions. 
TABLE VII.  FRAM BASED VARIABILITY MODEL OF AMAN FUNCTIONS 
AMAN functions variability model 
Functioning modes Output values 
Normal functioning 
Information availlability (YES) 
Information precision (RIGHT) 
Information computing delay 
(Optimum) 
Malfunctioning 
Information availlability (NO) 
Information precision (-) 
Information computing delay (-) 
Misleading information 
Information availlability (YES) 
Information precision (FALSE) 
Information computing delay 
(Optimum) 
 
Operator’s functions variability model is related to the 
relation between performance context, adaptive mode and 
functions outputs.  
Depending of the values of the different dimension of 
variability related to the operator, the environment and the 
coupling relation in particular coupling with automation 
functions an adaptive mode is selected. Following tables 
describes this relation for AMAN operator’s functions. First 
one is related to the list of dimension of variability taken in 
account.  
TABLE VIII.  FRAM BASED DIMENSION OF VARIABILITY LIST OF AMAN 
OPERATOR’S FUNCTIONS 
Dimension of variability 
Endogenous dimension of variability 
Habit to AMAN [High (10), Medium(5), Low] 
Training [High (10), Medium(5), Low] 
Workload [High (10), Medium(5), Low] 
Stress [High (10), Medium(5), Low] 
Focus of attention [High (10), Medium(5), Low] 
Number of tasks [High (10), Medium(5), Low] 
Exogenous dimension of variability 
Working conditions [High (10), Medium(5), Low] 
Complexity of traffic [High (10), Medium(5), Low] 
Amount of traffic [High (10), Medium(5), Low] 
Coupling dimension of variability 
AMAN Information 
Availlability [Yes, No] 
AMAN Information 
precision [Right, False] 
 
The second table is related to the relation between 
dimensions of variability average value and operator adaptation 
mode.  
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TABLE IX.  FRAM BASED RELATION BETWEEN DIMENSION OF 
VARIABILITY VALUES AND ADAPTIVE MODES OF AMAN OPERATOR’S FUNCTION 
AMAN functions variability model 
Adaptive modes Dimension on variability values 
Optimum 
Average (Endogeneous) == 10 AND 
Average (Exogenous) == 10 AND 
AMAN information availlability == Yes 
AND 
AMAN information precision == Right 
Average 
Average (Endogeneous) >= 5 AND 
Average (Exogenous) >= 5 AND 
AMAN information availlability == Yes 
AND 
AMAN information precision == Right 
Degraded 
 AMAN information availlability == No 
OR 
AMAN information precision == False 
The third table is related to the relation between adaptive 
modes with values of function outputs. 
TABLE X.  FRAM BASED RELATION BETWEEN DIMENSION OF 
VARIABILITY VALUES AND ADAPTIVE MODES OF AMAN OPERATOR’S FUNCTION 
AMAN functions variability model 
Adaptive modes Output values 
Optimum  Precision (Optimum) Delay (Optimum) 
Average  Precision (Average) Delay (Average) 
Degraded  Precision (False) Delay (Late) 
With the application of the relationships described with 
those three tables, automation degradation modes and 
environment are linked to operator’s behaviors.  
This model will be the basement of the level 2 modelling 
activities.  
B. Modeling Automation degradation consequences on the 
capacity to respond 
The second level aims to support modelling of the 
propagation of the variability of level 1 model to the capacity 
of respond using the automation studied.  
1) Step 1. Description of the capacity to respond context 
The first phase is related to the definition of the capacity to 
respond context. This context is related to unwanted situation 
to be responded and respond capacity associated.  
Unwanted situation to be responded is described with its 
name, a set of states related to its evolution, and for each states 
a performance profile (time required, resources required, 
competences required and knowledge required) required to 
keep the control of the situation.  
Respond capacity is described with its name, description of 
the different functions (detect, identify, recognize, define 
respond and respond) and a set of respond modes related to the 
balance between performance profile required and performance 
profile available.    
2) Step 2. Level 2  function definition.  
Based on the context description, the level 1 functional 
model is extended to consider the respond capacity processes 
and functions related to the events associated with the respond 
function. 
A set of function is associated to the capacity of respond 
and coupled with Level 1 model. Two situations can occur. The 
first one, automation studied support partially or totally the 
respond capacity. The second one, automation studied is 
related to the situation to be responded. In the first case, 
respond function is split in order to consider level 1 functions. 
In the second case, one function related to the capacity of 
respond is considered and linked to the Level 1 model.   
3) Step 3 Propagation model definiton.  
 Propagation model definition is realized with defining 
relationships between dimensions of variability (endogenous, 
exogenous and coupling) of respond function and four respond 
modes:  
 Strategic. Situations where the system as a time 
horizon and can look ahead at higher-level goals. 
 Tactical. Situations where performance more or less 
follows a known procedure or a rule. 
 Opportunistic. Situations where the salient features of 
the current context determine the next action 
 Scrambled.  Situations where the choice of next action 
is basically random 
This relation is defining by considering relations between 
available and required dimensions: resources, time, information 
and competences.  The following rules are used to define the 
relationships:  
 In strategic control mode, dimensions required to 
perform functions is much superior to available 
dimensions 
 In tactical control mode, dimensions required to 
perform functions is just superior to available 
dimensions 
 In opportunistic control mode, dimensions required to 
perform functions is inferior to available dimensions 
 In scrambled control mode, dimension required to 
perform functions is much inferior to available 
dimension.    
Then relationships between respond modes and respond 
functions output a characteristic is defined.  
This model is used as a starting point for the definition of a 
model of level 3.  
C. Modelling Automation degradation consequences on node 
resilience capacity 
 The third level aims to support modelling propagation of 
the variability of model of level 2 to the node resilience 
capacity. 
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 1) Step 1. Resilience capacity description.  
This first phase is related to the description of the 
information about the node resilience capacity. Information is 
related to the different events that the node have to deal with 
and respond function associated. Events are considering related 
to the following typology: normal events, regular unexpected 
events and irregular unexpected events. For each event 
consequences of an inadequate response (in time or in 
precision) are defined.   
2) Step 2. Level 3  function definition.  
Based on the description provided, model of level 2 is 
extended in considering the respond functions associated to the 
other events. Attention have to be made in the different 
coupling relation between the different respond capacity 
functions in order to model the interdependence between them 
(share of operators and/or resources, delay, priorities, etc.).  
3) Step 3. Level 3 function variability model definition.  
A FRAM based variability model of the level 3 functions is 
defined. Level 2 variability model definition step is applied to 
the several respond functions that constitute the model. 
 Once this method is applied, a FRAM model at level 3 is 
produced. This model can be used as a starting point for the 
definition of a model of level 4.  
D.  Modelling Automation degradation consequences on 
network performance 
The fourth level aims to support modelling propagation of 
the variability of model of level 3 to the network performance. 
1) Step 1. Network structure performance description.  
This first phase is related to the description of network 
structure and performance. For each node that constitutes the 
network key performance indicators are defined. For each type 
of links between nodes (physical, cyber, geographic, etc.) a 
description is also provided.   
2) Step 2. Level 4  function definition.  
Based on the description provided, model of level 3 is 
extended in considering the functions and performance 
indicators of the nodes and the several links of connection.   
3) Step 3. Level 4 function variability model definition.  
A FRAM based variability model of the level 4 functions is 
defined. A relation between variability of node inputs, node 
performance model, and nodes output and environment 
variability is defined based on the variability model of level 3.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
The overall objective of the ongoing work presented in this 
paper is to define an overall design framework of automation 
degradation propagation in complex networks, and an 
associated method supporting the framework in order to study 
automation and more precisely automation degradation. A four 
steps process has been presented in the current paper focusing 
on the modelling of consequences flowing from automation 
degradation. We have exemplified this process on a case study 
in the domain of Air Traffic Management showing how the 
refinement is performed and how additional information 
gathered is modelled.  We also presented how automation 
degradation propagates and how information related to 
consequences is gathered and modelled in the context of that 
case study. 
The next phases of the research work is related to the 
application of the other phases of the method to the AMAN 
case study in order to consolidate and to improve the method, 
and to be able to apply it to another case study in the area of 
RPAS (Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems). The application of 
the process on these two case studies will allow us to confront 
the method and its associated framework to applications 
featuring different levels of automations according to Sheridan 
et al. classification [11].  
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